2 is in fact "simply their will" (33). Therefore, "the exercise of active power is simply volition" (33), where volition is the sort of mental act that causes the sorts of actions (whether these be actions of the mind-thoughts-or actions of the body-motions) that are called 'voluntary' (27) .
(3) An agent S "acts freely in performing action a [i.e., possesses freedom of action with respect to a] iff (i) S does a because S wills to do a [i.e., S's doing a is voluntary], and (ii) if S had not willed to do a, S would not have done a" (27). Thus: " [L] iberty is an active power just by virtue of will being an active power. The extra element that makes an action free as well as voluntarythat if the agent had willed otherwise she would have done otherwiseimports no new activity" (33).
(4) Mere possession of active power (or will, or freedom of action) does not distinguish those who are moral agents from those who are not, for "animals possess active power" (38), and hence have wills and consequently freedom of action (under certain circumstances), without being moral agents (38, 41). (5) There are "two different notions of liberty" (51), namely, freedom of action and "the sort of full-fledged free agency that derives from having the capacity to suspend the prosecution of one's most pressing desires and deliberate about the best course of action" (63).
(6) Thus: What distinguishes beings who are moral agents from beings who are not is full-fledged free agency, rather than freedom of action. I contend that every one of these eight theses is false. Instead, I will argue that in the later editions of the Essay Locke conceives of active power not as the underlying source of the capacity to make changes, but as the capacity to make changes by one's own power (rather than by the power of another); that active power is not unique to spirits and should not be identified with the will, which is merely one among many active powers; that Locke's conception of freedom of action is merely the ability to do as one wills (which he takes to include the ability to forbear what one wills to forbear); that he isn't concerned with providing necessary and sufficient conditions for acting freely or for free actions, and that freedom of action, properly conceived, includes neither a voluntariness condition nor a counterfactual condition; that although (non-human) animals have many active powers, they do not possess wills or freedom of action, and hence animals provide no reason to think that something in addition to freedom of action is required for moral agency; that there is indeed only one notion of liberty, namely freedom of action, and that the ability to suspend is merely a species of this freedom; that what distinguishes beings who are moral agents from beings who are not is freedom of action generally, which includes the power to suspend; that suspension of desire can, and indeed must, be voluntary, and that what causes such suspension is the volition to suspend, itself usually determined by uneasiness at the thought of not suspending; and that although Locke may indeed be agnostic about the metaphysical grounds of moral agency, he is not thoroughly agnostic about all metaphysical aspects of his theory of freedom.
Let me now consider each thesis in turn.
1. I agree with LoLordo that Locke thinks of power in general as the capacity to change or be changed, and that Locke's views about the nature of active power changed from the early editions to the later editions of the Essay. But I deny that Locke's later conception of active power is as the underlying source of change. LoLordo rests her case for this claim mostly on Mattern (1980) , who argues that whereas in the early editions of the Essay Locke officially defines active power as the ability to make change, in the later editions Locke officially defines active power as the capacity to do something by one's own choice (71). On this interpretation, mere bodies (such as billiard balls) possess active power according to the early definition, but do not possess active power according to the late definition.
2 In the early editions, Mattern argues, Locke claims that human beings acquire an obscure, imperfect, and inadequate idea of active power from the observation of bodies (see E II.xxi. (33). 4 But this is not accurate. Even in the case of billiard-ball collisions, bodies can provide us with the idea of generating motion. Locke's point at E II.xxi.4 and E II.xxiii.28 is that the idea we acquire from the observation of billiard-ball collisions and their ilk is obscure, not that it is non-existent.
Next, LoLordo notes that Locke says that the idea of "Mobility, or the Power of being moved" is received "by our Senses…from Body", and the idea of "Motivity, of the Power of moving" is received "by reflection…from our Minds" (E II.xxi.73: 286). This might be read to suggest that the idea of motivity is not acquired from sense perception.
But it is possible that Locke is simply being conservative and careful in not explicitly saying that the idea of motivity is acquired through the senses. Locke claims here is that the idea of body includes, whereas the idea of spirit does not include, the ideas of cohesion and of communicating motion by impulse; and that the idea of spirit includes, whereas the idea of body does not include, the ideas of thinking and of putting body into motion by thought. The fact that the idea of body does not include the idea of putting body into motion by thought does not entail that the idea of body does not include the idea of putting body into motion, period; and even if it did, it would not follow that bodies themselves do not have a power that is not included in their nominal essence. Indeed, this is a quite general point: the fact that the nominal essence of a book does not include the idea that it can be used as a paperweight does not entail that a book itself cannot be used as a paperweight.
2. LoLordo argues that, for Locke (at least in the later editions of the Essay), active power is unique to spirits, that it is their will, and that the exercise of active power is simply volition. In saying this, she (self-consciously) echoes Mattern's claim that "active power is now defined as a capacity to do something by one's own choice" (1980, 71). I suggested above that Locke allows for the possibility (indeed, the actuality) that some inanimate bodies possess active powers inasmuch as they are capable of producing motion in other bodies without borrowing their motion from some external cause. If this is correct, then, pace LoLordo and Mattern, active powers are not unique to spirits and cannot be identified with their wills.
LoLordo claims that E II.xxiii.18 "suggests…that the active power of spirits is simply their will". This is roughly right, but LoLordo goes further, claiming that the idea of active power and the idea of will, though not identical, are co-extensive: "all exercises of active powers are volitions, and all volitions are the exercise of active power" (34). Here it is plain what the conditions for an agent S's being free in respect of action A are:
S is free in respect of action A iff (i) S has the power to do A if S wills to do A, and (ii) S has the power to forbear doing A if S wills to forbear doing A.
Locke here presupposes as part of (i) and (ii) that S has a will, i.e., a power "to order the consideration of any Idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any 13 part of the body to its rest, and vice versa in any particular instance" (E II.xxi.5: 236).
For Locke claims that a tennis ball's not being free in respect of its motion or rest derives from the fact that it does not have the power to think or will (E II.xxi.9: 238). But notice that to say that S cannot be free (with respect to any action) unless S has a will is not to say that S cannot do a freely unless a is voluntary (i.e., unless S does a because S wills to do a). There is therefore no more than superficial similarity between what Locke says about the tennis ball and what LoLordo says about the conditions for acting freely.
LoLordo glosses an agent's power to forbear doing a in counterfactual terms. As she sees it, S has the power to forbear doing a iff if S had not willed to do a, S would not have done a. 6 Interestingly, the counterfactual gloss never appears in Locke's text. The reason, I believe, is that Locke would not endorse, and indeed would oppose, such a gloss.
As LoLordo notices (27, n. 2), Locke explicitly counts "holding one's peace" as a she can produce silence if she wills to produce silence, and (ii) she can speak if she wills to speak. As Locke sees it, to determine whether Sally is free to hold her peace, we need to ask, not whether Sally would have failed to speak if she had not willed to speak, but rather whether Sally is able to forbear speaking if she wills to forbear speaking.
LoLordo claims that, for Locke, the active power of a spirit is its will. Faced with the problem that a spirit's liberty, which is distinct from its will, also appears to be an active power, LoLordo counters as follows: "Locke is being at worst slightly careless here, for liberty is an active power just by virtue of will being an active power. The extra
[counterfactual] element that makes an action free as well as voluntary…imports no new activity" (33). Most of this just strikes me as confused. It is true, as LoLordo says, that
for Locke the will of a spirit is an active power, for it is a power to issue a mental order to the mind or body (E II.xxi.5: 236). But, as I've argued, it is a mistake for LoLordo to suggest that her analysis of acting freely is an analysis of Locke's freedom or liberty of action. So her conclusion that, for Locke, liberty is an active power just by virtue of will being an active power doesn't follow. The truth, I believe, is that Locke's freedom of action is a combination of two conditional active powers (the power to act in accordance with one's volition to act + the power to forbear acting in accordance with one's volition to so forbear), each of which is completely distinct from (and does not in any way result from) the will. 7 It is therefore misleading to suggest that, at bottom, the only real active power of a spirit is its will. Under ordinary circumstances, a spirit also has the power to initiate thought (without borrowing anything from without), and this appears to be an active power if anything is.
LoLordo is ultimately interested in the necessary and sufficient conditions for counting
as a moral agent. Much of her discussion of active power, will, and freedom is designed to establish that, on Locke's view, none of these three features distinguishes moral agents from non-moral agents, for "animals possess active power" (38), and hence have wills and consequently freedom of action, without being moral agents (38, 41). I agree with
LoLordo that Locke takes animals to possess active power, for he takes them to have the ability to move their bodies (and other bodies too) without relying on borrowed motion to do so. But LoLordo errs in supposing that Locke takes animals to have will (or freedom), for there is strong textual evidence that this is something Locke denies. The relevant textual evidence comes from an extended discussion of superaddition in Locke's third letter to Stillingfleet.
In the relevant passage, Locke is criticizing those (including, presumably, Stillingfleet) who think that God can superadd to matter some properties not already contained in the essence of matter, but that God cannot superadd to matter thought, reason, and volition. The passage is noteworthy because it reveals what kinds of properties Locke thinks would need to be added to mere matter to get plants, animals, and, if such were possible, material spirits:
God creates an extended solid substance, without the superadding any thing else to it, and so we may consider it at rest: to some parts of it he superadds motion, but it has still the essence of matter: other parts of it he frames into plants, with all the excellencies of vegetation, life, and beauty, which are to be found in a rose or a peach-tree, &c. above the essence of matter in general, but it is still but matter:
to other parts he adds sense and spontaneous motion, and those other properties that are to be found in an elephant. Hitherto it is not doubted but the power of God may go, and that the properties of a rose, a peach, or an elephant, superadded to matter, change not the properties of matter; but matter is in these things matter still. But if one venture to go one step further, and say, God may give to matter thought, reason, and volition, as well as sense and spontaneous motion, there are men ready presently to limit the power of the omnipotent Creator, and tell us he cannot do it; because it destroys the essence, "changes the essential properties of matter." (W4: 460)
It is clear from this passage both that Locke takes animals, such as elephants, to possess sense and spontaneous motion (i.e., the power to move themselves without relying on borrowed external motion) and that animals lack those properties in addition to sense and spontaneous motion that would be needed to turn them into material spirits, namely thought, reason, and importantly, volition. In Locke's universe, then, animals have sense and spontaneous motion, but no will or volition. When animals move themselves, then, it is not by thought or volition, but rather by instinct, as when a spider spins its web, a bee dances, or a dog buries a bone. In none of these cases does Locke envisage the animal giving its body the mental order to excrete, shimmy, or dig.
In his inimitable attempt to pound Stillingfleet into submission by repetition ad nauseam, Locke then goes over the very same points, spinning each part in greater detail.
First, he argues that after creating bare extended solid substance, God superadds motion to it in order to make the planets revolve around remote centres and to make either matter move in crooked lines or matter attract matter, all without destroying the essence of matter (W4: 461). He then moves on to "the vegetable part of creation", which "is not doubted to be wholly material" (W4: 461), and yet which is acknowledged to contain "excellencies and operations", presumably superadded by God again without destruction of matter's essence. Moving "one step farther", Locke considers "the animal world", to account for which Locke supposes that God superadds to matter "life, sense, and spontaneous motion", and, for the continued existence of species, the "power of propagation" (W4: 462). Locke then moves "one degree farther", considering the possibility of God's superadding to matter the power to think or will (engage in is clearly not an instance of freedom of action, given that "[i]t seems obvious that beings can meet the 2.21.8 conditions for acting freely even if they do not possess the ability to suspend and deliberate", for "all 2.21.8 requires for an action to be free is for it to be caused by a volition, and for it to be the case that if the agent had willed differently she would have acted differently" (43). 9 But here LoLordo is being led astray by her mistaken belief that Locke uses E II.xxi.8 to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for acting freely. As I've already argued, Locke does nothing of the sort.
In fact the power to suspend is just a special case of liberty of action. Why, then, does Locke describe the power to suspend as "the source of all liberty" and as the "great inlet, and exercise of all the liberty Men have"? The answer lies in statements about the power of suspension in nearby passages that LoLordo does not quote. Locke writes that the power to suspend is "the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual Beings in their constant endeavours after, and a steady prosecution of true felicity" , that "to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a 20 fair Examination" is "the end and use of our Liberty" , that "the care of our selves, that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness, is the necessary foundation of our liberty" (E II.xxi.51: 266) , and that the power to suspend "was given that the point or function of the power of suspension is the attainment of happiness (namely, pleasure and the absence of pain), which is less likely to be achieved "whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon before due Examination" (E II.xxi.47: 263) . For the forbearance to will gives us room to consider whether the course of action our most pressing desire is impelling us to take will produce a greater overall balance of pleasure and pain than any available alternative. Someone who allows herself to be driven by her most pressing desires may well be free, Locke says, but does not have freedom worth the name: for it is not "worth the name of Freedom to be at liberty to play the Fool, and draw Shame and Misery upon [oneself]" (E II.xxi.50: 265).
When one exercises the power of suspension, then, one not only exercises one's freedom not to will to do what one's desires recommend, one also increases the likelihood of achieving the end, use, and foundation of our liberty, which is the avoidance of misery and the acquisition of pleasure.
6. There is therefore no reason to suppose, with LoLordo, that what distinguishes moral agents from non-moral agents is the power to suspend, thought of as an active power distinct from both will and freedom of action. As far as I can see, there is no reason to deny that for Locke moral agents are just free agents, that is, agents who are able to do as they will. Such agents have the power to suspend, among other powers that are instances of freedom of action. But there is nothing (metaphysically) special about the power of suspension that differentiates it from freedom of mental action more generally: the former is no more than an instance of the latter.
7. It is an interesting question whether Locke thinks that the suspension of desire itself can be voluntary. LoLordo thinks that Locke's answer is that it can't be. Her reason is this: "Suspension precedes the determination of will by desire-by any desire: 'during this suspension of any desire, before the will be determined to action' (2.21.47). Rather, when we suspend, what we are doing is putting on hold the process whereby desires normally determine volitions" (49). This interpretation strikes me as an overreading of the passage from E II.xxi.47. Locke's point in the context may be captured as follows.
Every human agent is buffeted by desires, the most pressing of which at any time pushes her to a particular action (say, eating the piece of chocolate cake in front of her). In such a case, she typically has the power to suspend the prosecution of the most pressing desire to act in a particular way (the desire to eat the piece of cake), in order to consider whether it would be better for her on the whole to act in that particular way (to eat the piece of cake). So when Locke says that suspension precedes the determination of will by any desire, he means that suspension precedes the determination of will by any desire to act in such-and-such particular way: he does not mean that suspension precedes the determination of will by any desire, period.
If we do not overread the passage from E II.xxi.47, we see that it leaves room for the possibility that suspension of the prosecution of a desire to do a is a voluntary act of 22 mind (really, a voluntary forbearance to will) that can be determined (i.e., made determinate) by a desire, namely the desire to suspend (rather than the desire to do a). In the typical case, in keeping with common sense, Locke would be saying that suspension occurs because one wills to suspend, and that one wills to suspend because one desires to suspend, and that one desires to suspend because one is uneasy at the thought that the hasty prosecution of one's most pressing desire may lead to a notably suboptimal outcome. And indeed there is textual evidence that Locke understands suspension to be the kind of mental act that can be (and often is) voluntary. Locke writes: "Nor let any one say, he cannot govern his Passions, nor hinder them from breaking out, and carrying him into action; for what he can do before a Prince, or a great Man, he can do alone, or in the presence of God, if he will" (E II.xxi.53: 268-underlining added). Here Locke says that in most cases human beings have the power to prevent their passions from carrying them into action, i.e., have the power to suspend the prosecution of their most pressing desires, and that this is something that they can do if they will it. This statement does not make sense unless it is presupposed that human beings can (and often do) will to suspend.
In this respect, suspension, which is a forbearance to will, is really no different from any other mental act or forbearance. I have the ability to forbear obsessing by willing to forbear obsessing, to forbear replaying a popular tune in my head by willing to forbear replaying it, and so on. Similarly, I have the ability to forbear willing to eat the piece of chocolate cake, by willing to wait before choosing whether to eat that piece of cake.
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If suspension is not the kind of mental action that can be willed, then, give
Locke's account of freedom of action, we cannot be free with respect to the act of suspending. But if Sally does not have the power to suspend or not suspend, as she wills, 23 then it seems wrong to criticize her for her failure to suspend. And yet Locke is highly critical of human beings' failures to suspend. He writes that "when we have [suspended in order to engage in examination of the potential consequences of our actions], we have done our duty" (E II.xxi.52: 267), that "we may see how it comes to pass, that a Man may justly incur punishment, though it be certain that in all the particular actions that he wills, he does, and necessarily does will that, which he then judges to be good", for "though his will be always determined by that, which is judg'd good by his Understanding, yet it excuses him not: Because, by a too hasty choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil…He has vitiated his own Palate, and must be answerable to himself for the sickness and death that follows from it" (E II.xxi.56: 270-71). It follows that Locke is committed to the view that whether humans suspend or not is a matter of choice: for if an agent's failure to suspend is something that happens regardless of her choices, then it seems wrong to criticize her for her failure to suspend.
8. LoLordo concludes from her claim that Locke is agnostic about the causes of suspension that his account of freedom does not require commitment to any metaphysical theses about its basis, or about the relative of virtues of libertarianism or necessitarianism.
Because, as I have argued, Locke is not actually agnostic about what moves us to suspend, LoLordo's conclusion does not follow. What we can say about Locke's account of freedom is that, like Hobbes's, it is compatible with necessitarianism. For even if all of our actions are causally necessitated, we are still free to act as long as we have the ability to do as we will. And we have such an ability as long as we are not subject to compulsions or restraints (E II.xxi.13: 240), such as locked rooms (E II.xxi.10: 238),
